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Abstract
This paper examines China’s role in the extractive industry sectors of sub-Saharan Africa and
issues surrounding governance—particularly the maximisation of host country economic gains.
China’s involvement is controversial and the focus of international debate as to the extent to
which Chinese–African relationships in this key sector are not ‘win–win’ but are damaging
African partner economies and political cultures. The paper’s motivation is a desire to explain
more closely the growing involvement of China in sub-Saharan Africa’s extractives sector in
terms of how effectively African governance works to maximise the gains accruing to China’s
African partners. A central question is how far there is Chinese synchronisation with the rules,
principles, norms and behavioural expectations of African partners. The study assesses the
experience of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Key findings are that China’s
involvement takes many forms, but is heavily influenced by its own history as well as its emerging
engagement with the international development assistance system. The DRC case demonstrates
that the effectiveness of African regulatory regimes is highly variable and depends on the quality
of governance. Africa has extensive regulatory and normative regimes that frame the Chinese
relationship. However, to maximise gains to African partners, the Chinese state and Chinese
firms must strengthen policy on corporate responsibilities and practice whilst African states must
strengthen the quality of governance to turn political commitments into more robust practice.
Full text
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1. Introduction
This paper examines China’s role in the extractive industry sectors of sub-Saharan
Africa and issues surrounding governance—particularly that of the maximisation of
host country economic gains. It includes a specific study of the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC). China’s involvement in the DRC’s extractives sector has grown
substantially over the past decade and a half. This growing role is driven by three
factors: (i) the need to meet a growing demand for resources; (ii) a need to establish
reliable long-term sources of supply to balance indigenous resource depletion; and (iii)
a strategic need to increase the security of supply through risk diversification. However,
it is important not to overstate the current scale of China’s role. China’s total outward
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the extractive industries in 2011 still only amounted
to USD 67 billion and, as Peter Nolan has pointed out, its total stock of outward FDI in
these industries represented a quarter of the assets of Royal Dutch Shell and a third of
those of ExxonMobil (2014, 143‒144).
1
China’s growing presence is controversial (Hairong and Sautman, 2013). China and
its African government partners stress the mutual benefits of their relationships and
there is substantive evidence of China’s capacity-building and infrastructural impact. In
the steel sector, for example, a recent study concludes that China's selection of Guinea
and Liberia as priority partners suggests ‘potential for structural change in their
integration with the world economy. For China this could offer vast iron ore resources
[…] [and] […] see selective commodity markets increasingly driven by intra-developing
country dynamics […]’ (Johnston, 2017). Such ‘win–win’ potential notwithstanding,
long-standing concerns remain regarding the structure of trade and a raft of social,
environmental and corporate responsibility issues (McGreal, 2007). These concerns
were voiced by the then South African President Jacob Zuma, who pointed out at the
2012 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) meeting that ‘Africa’s commitment
to China’s development has been demonstrated by supply of raw materials, other
products and technology transfer. […] This trade pattern is unsustainable in the long
term. Africa’s past economic experience with Europe dictates a need to be cautious
when entering into partnerships with other economies’ (Financial Times, 2012).
China’s relationship to Africa’s so-called ‘resource curse’ has also been subject to
scrutiny (Su, Wei and Tao 2016). Critics argue that China is simply replicating the
‘resource curse’ of many of its developing partners, locking them into structural
underdevelopment, and undermining efforts being made to pursue sustainable
development effectively and, critically, to strengthen the quality of governance in their
countries. As Lawson-Remer and Greenstein note: ‘Instead of creating prosperity,
resources have too often fostered corruption, undermined inclusive economic growth,
incited armed conflict and damaged the environment’ (2012, 1). The debate also
encompasses the social impact of Chinese firms. A recent German Institute of Global
and Area Studies (GIGA) study concluded ‘that the effect of Chinese mining companies
on African local development is ambiguous: while proximity to Chinese-operated mines
is associated with anti-Chinese sentiments and unemployment, populations living close
to Chinese mining areas enjoy better infrastructure, such as paved roads or piped water’
(Wegenast et al., 2017).
2
A key issue is that of the extent to which there is Chinese synchronisation with the
rules, principles, norms and behavioural expectations of established international
regimes such as those centred upon the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
(EITI) and the UN Convention against Corruption and how this relates to issues of
governance in China’s partner countries, such as transparency and accountability
(Global Witness, 2013). Recent studies have sought to explore new approaches to
governance of natural resources through the prism of China–Africa relations in the
natural resources sectors (Alden and Alves, 2015). This interest reflects both the scale of
Chinese involvement in these industries in many developing countries as well as the
critical importance of these industries to host state economies.
3
This paper argues that the growth of Chinese trade and investment with Africa and
the concomitant increased presence of Chinese firms, many operating with little or no
4
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Box 1. Governance challenges in the extractive industries
corporate social responsibility (CSR), has posed significant difficulties for the overall
structure of trade, local producers and traders, labour relations and worker rights, and
environmental and wider social and community relations. Nevertheless, issues such as
CSR are being addressed by the Chinese government, perhaps not as quickly and with
the degree of enforcement power that some critics wish to see, but still with testable
outcomes and evidence of improved CSR behaviour and reporting.
In a 2015 analysis, the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) argued
that African institutions are in a dysfunctional state. The SAIIA study offers
recommendations on how to achieve more effective and resilient institutions at the
national, regional, and continental levels. Its central argument is that there is a need for
institutional designs that are responsive to local contexts, are adaptable to changing
circumstances, and reflect a shared consensus and shared aspirations (SAIIA, 2015).
Governance challenges in conflict and post-conflict societies, such as the DRC, remain
substantial. One such study investigated local governance, conflict and peace-building
in the DRC, focusing on Congolese governance processes at national, provincial, and
community levels. This report found that ‘political’ decentralisation is ‘just a more
limited “territorial” form rooted in elite struggles for power. The relevant legislation
and policy documentation makes scant reference to the core principles of political
decentralisation as understood more broadly – accountability and participation. […]
[a]nd there is consequently a significant reluctance at national level to cede power and
roll out the programme as originally planned’ (Gaynor, 2013, 1-2).
5
The current agenda has come to focus on achieving greater resilience in governance
related to extractive industries (Culverwell et al., 2002; World Bank, 2016b; Wilton
Park, 2014; GIZ, 2014; McCullough, 2016); assessing the EITI (Moberg and Ponsford,
2016); environmental issues (Compagnon and Alejandro, 2013); transparency and
accountability (McHenry et al., 2015); CSR (Abuya, 2016; Wilson, 2015); studies of
human rights, particularly those of indigenous peoples (see, for example,
O’Faircheallaigh and Ali (2008) or Acura’s more recent study of indigenous peoples and
socio-environmental conflicts (2015)); and the sector’s role in conflict and post-conflict
societies (Maconachie, 2016; Akiwumi and Hollist, 2016; CSG, 2015). The focus today is
on local content provision (Andreasson, 2015; Albo, 2015), equitable management
(UNDP, 2012), community participation (Andrews, 2018), as well as revenue allocation
and local politics (Arellano-Yanguas and Mejía-Acosta, 2014), and revenue transfers for
social development, a central issue here being that of anti-corruption measures in the
extractives sector (OECD, 2016).
6
Simons and Jacklin identify a ‘governance gap’ between the extractive industries and
host states, using human rights as their primary analytical prism, arguing that it is
domestic policy and practice that offer the most potential for effective action (2014). As
Table 1 below illustrates, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
(GIZ) lists the governance challenges in the extractive industries:
7
an inadequate fiscal regime
a lack of both capacities and clear definition of responsibilities within and between state
institutions
the absence of a uniform legal framework for the
extractive sector; instead we see individual contracts, contradictory legislation, poor
transparency and competition between individual ministries
inadequate regional harmonisation and cooperation between governments of countries that
share resources
negative impacts in extractive regions caused by lack of
involvement of municipalities in designing the
frameworks for resource extraction
excessive expectations of the population regarding the
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Source: GIZ, 2014
2. China in sub-Saharan Africa
benefits of extraction
inefficiency and mismanagement caused by corruption
failure to meet human rights obligations.
This extensive list takes us to the heart of the issue, namely, governance. The concept
of ‘governance’ is widely understood to refer to political culture—the values and
principles that give rise to what Kjær describes as the key concepts of ‘legitimacy,
efficiency, democracy and accountability’. In this reading, governance is primarily
concerned with the qualitative efficacy of the political system and is principally about
‘authority’ and ‘trust’ (2004, 7‒11). In China, the Western concept of governance is very
well understood, but has limited play in the Chinese language literature; ‘governance’ is
still principally defined ‘government’, itself defined in terms of public administration
and its utilitarian effectiveness. The Chinese translation of ‘governance’ is ‘Tongzhi’ or
‘Zhili’, which have strong authoritarian connotations in Chinese. Consequently, very
few people apply this concept of ‘governance’ within China, preferring terms such as
‘public administration’ or ‘governmental management’, embodying the import value of
the duty of the citizenry to serve the public good (Xun, 2012).
8
In their analysis of political instability in the Middle East, Chen and Li emphasise the
overriding importance of economic development for national governance, stability and
security (2011). Indeed, this is evident in the Dublin City University (DCU) study of the
DRC noted above, where the empirical evidence pointed to the paramountcy of
economic rights and justice, more employment, and the ending of poverty and
inequality (Gaynor, 2013). Here lies the heart of the issue. Whilst there is a declaratory
commitment to ‘Western’/‘traditional’ donor emphasis on ‘political’ governance, it is
actually China’s notion of governance embedded in economic rights that is most
attractive to China’s strategic partners in Africa, given the continuing challenges they
face daily in meeting the basic needs of many of their citizens and the rising
aspirational aims of a burgeoning middle class.
9
China has been Africa’s largest trade partner since 2009. China has set a target of
USD 400 billion, which it intends to reach by 2020. China’s total trade with Africa rose
16.8 per cent to USD 38.8 billion in the first quarter of 2017, the first year-on-year
increase since 2015. This was due to a 46 per cent rise in annual imports from Africa in
the first quarter with agricultural imports rising 18 per cent, while Chinese exports
recorded a smaller fall of 1 per cent from a year earlier (Reuters, 2017). China’s
enterprises have been encouraged and supported by the Chinese government and
Chinese financial agencies to internationalise and ‘go out’ to Africa (Brautigam, 2009;
2011), Africa being regarded as ‘the last golden land’ (Gu, 2009; 2011). Deconstructing
China's investment in Africa is a complex and often opaque process involving Chinese
central and state loans, provincial-level investment, state-owned and private direct
foreign investment (FDI). One commentary notes that China’s then Minister of
Commerce, Chen Deming, stated in mid-2012 that as of the end of 2011 China’s
cumulative FDI in Africa ‘exceeded USD14.7 billion, up 60 per cent from 2009.’  Also in
mid-2012, the resident Chinese ambassador to South Africa, Tian Xuejun, stated that:
‘China’s investment in Africa of various kinds exceeds USD 40 billion, among which
USD14.7 billion is direct investment’ (Shinn, 2012, 1).  Bilateral China-Africa
partnership and official Chinese development assistance is framed significantly by
FOCAC. The 2015 FOCAC, for example, saw China commit to USD 60 billion in
development project cooperation (BBC, 2015). In addition, China’s engagement with
Africa works multilaterally through the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa) group (Gu et al., 2016) and trilateral cooperation (Gu et al., 2017), and is also
supported by the country’s strengthening aid provision (Brautigam, 2011). Further
10
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3. The DRC and China
buttressing this emerging Chinese multilateralism is the Belt and Road Initiative, the
so-called new ‘Silk Roads’ project that embraces Africa (Gu, 2015).
After a fall in Chinese FDI in 2015, Chinese investment into Africa was not affected
by a slowdown in trade in 2016. In the period between January 2013 and July 2016, the
number of projects recorded rose by 112 per cent, the number of jobs created increased
by 413 per cent and the number of companies investing more than doubled, rising by
108 per cent (Curtis, 2016). In January–November 2016, direct investment from
Chinese enterprises into Africa increased 25 per cent, with more than USD 3 billion
invested (MOFCOM, 2017). China’s FDI recorded a 64 per cent increase in the first
quarter of 2017, with countries such as the Republic of Djibouti, Senegal and South
Africa all experiencing rises of over 100 per cent in the period (Reuters, 2017).
11
There has been substantial coverage of China’s commitment to infrastructural
capacity-building in sub-Saharan Africa, the Beijing Government receiving many
plaudits for its funding and on-the-ground record of project delivery. This commitment
is bilateral between China and each of the states in the region and operates through
mechanisms such as the new South–South Fund. But it is also substantially multi-
lateralised, not only through FOCAC, but also via the Asian International Investment
Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB), the Contingency Reserve
Agreement (CRA) and the China-financed infrastructure fund of the African
Development Bank (AfDB). But, despite this, concerns and caveats remain, and include
project commitments not completed; ‘footloose’ Chinese money and corporate interests
seeking higher returns, fresh markets and the enhanced corporate strategic security
offered by diversification of supply by resource-rich countries in regions such as South-
East Asia and Latin America; and the strategy of ‘new normal’ annual GDP of ‘around’
6.7 per cent.
12
A recent study argues that ‘the Chinese government and firms engage in a modified
one-tier bargaining process with the host country government in Africa’. The study
argues that the Chinese Government represents state-owned and private Chinese
natural resource multinationals collectively in negotiating with host governments.
There is little or no second-tier negotiation between the Chinese natural resource
MNEs and the host country government. The authors conclude that ‘[t]he home and
host country governmental-level negotiation leads to a generally friendly FDI
environment for investments by Chinese firms as well as specific investment
opportunities for Chinese firms. […] Chinese MNEs act as executers of government
negotiation outcomes between home and host countries, and fulfil the Chinese
government’s commitments to the host country government’ (Li, et al., 2013, 300).
13
In 2014, the DRC’s extractives sector accounted for 95 per cent of exports, 22 per cent
of GDP, 28 per cent of government revenues and 11 per cent of employment (EITI-DRC,
2015a, 1). Government and host governance in the DRC have been severely debilitated
by the long years of post-independence coup-ridden, autocratic, inept and corrupt
political and economic rule, civil wars and external interventions. The civil war that
lasted from 1997 to 2003 resulted in an estimated six million deaths. Conflict between
numerous warring groups has continued in eastern DRC and a UN peacekeeping force
is deployed. The DRC is endowed with substantial mineral resources, particularly
copper (Jamieson, 2016), offering the country the potential for significant natural
wealth. The DRC has about 3 per cent of global copper reserves, 45 per cent of global
cobalt, and 25 per cent of global diamonds as well as other precious minerals such as
gold and tantalum, but also zinc, uranium or tin. Copper has been the DRC’s largest
export, accounting for approximately 3 per cent of world production, with cobalt the
second largest export earner, accounting for 50 per cent of global cobalt (IMF, 2015).
On the back of high international demand and high prices for the DRC’s minerals, the
economy is estimated to have recorded 9.5 per cent annual GDP growth in 2014.
14
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However, as global and particularly Chinese demand started to decline, the rate fell to
6.9 per cent in 2015 and to 3.9 per cent in 2016 (World Bank, 2016b).
Realising the economy’s full potential has, throughout the country’s history, been
highly problematic. Quite apart from the ravages of conflict, resources have been
exploited by the country’s political elite and the militias and warlords engaged in civil
conflicts, and revenues lost to a venal political culture, weak institutions,
disadvantageous mining contracts with international extractives enterprises, and
ineffectual management and enforcement of the country’s mining regulations. In 2007,
the government reported it received only USD 400 million from the oil, gas and mining
sector, with oil and gas rather than mining being the primary sources of this revenue.
The EITI-DRC Report concluded that there is a ‘more resilient mining sector,
characterised by increased production, employment and revenues’ (EITI-DRC, 2016).
DRC EITI membership since 2007 is held to have facilitated a virtual revolution in the
size of revenues accruing to the national, provincial and local tiers of government and
administration. Revenues were raised to USD 2 billion compared to 2007, the actual
disbursements of revenues to the respective tiers of government and the monitoring
and enforcement of the mining code (EIDI-DRC, 2015).
15
China is the DRC’s principal trading partner. China was the DRC’s main destination
for exports and source of imports in 2015. China accounted for 46 per cent of exports,
amounting to USD 2.61 billion, and 25 per cent of imports with a total value of USD 1.41
billion. To put China’s significance to the DRC economy into some kind of context,
Zambia was the DRC’s second most important export destination, accounting for 16 per
cent of exports, worth USD 933 million, whilst South Africa was the country’s second
most important import partner, representing 16 per cent of imports, with a value of
USD 896 million (OEC, 2016).
16
The DRC has recorded a steady rise in inward FDI. In 2014, FDI inflows almost
doubled, reaching USD 5.5 billion, with falling commodity prices not deterring
investors, making the DRC the second-ranked recipient of FDI in Africa. China is the
primary source of the DRC’s FDI, followed by France and the US. In 2009, a ‘minerals-
for-infrastructure’ agreement was reached between the DRC government led by
President Joseph Kabila and a group of Chinese extractive enterprises backed
financially by the Chinese Exim Bank. The Kabila government was seeking a substantial
source of new funds to implement its electoral pledge regarding ‘five public works’ it
had prioritised—infrastructure, health, education, water and electricity, and housing
and employment—whilst China sought guaranteed sources of supply for strategically
important minerals. For example, China accounts for 45 per cent of the global demand
for copper, increasing its demand in 2016 alone by 5.3 per cent. The agreement
provided for China to invest USD 3 billion to redevelop a disused mine in the DRC and
another USD 6 billion in the form of infrastructure investments (3,215 km of railroads,
around 7,000 km of roads, 177 hospitals and health centres, two hydroelectric dams,
two universities and 5,000 accommodation units). Chinese firms would acquire access
rights to 10.6 million tons of copper and 600,000 tons of cobalt in the Katanga region.
In the years since, significant tensions have dogged both the agreement and the project
(Gu and McCluskey, 2015; Jansson, 2013, 1).
17
For example, in 2015, planned projects included the development of public arenas,
roads, solar projects and other works. The approximate total spending for these
projects for 2015 was USD 250 million. In addition, as of the end of 2014, a total of 14
joint Sino–Congolese mining projects were active. The total initial pledge towards these
projects amounted to USD 3.72 billion, including USD 320 million for a hydroelectric
power plant. The total actually invested in calendar year 2014 was USD 1.037 billion
(APO, 2015). Case evidence of China’s involvement includes the 2011 agreement
regarding the purchase of the DRC’s copper producer Anvil Mining Ltd (AVM) for USD
1.3 billion by Minmetals Resources Ltd, a unit of the state-owned China Minmetals
Group, primarily to supply for China (MOFCOM, 2011). Later the same year, in
December, China-based Zijin Mining Group invested USD 412 million in Canadian firm
Ivanhoe Mines’ Kamoa copper project, and in November 2016 it was announced that
the owners would transfer an additional 15 per cent holding to the DRC government,
taking its stake to 20 per cent. In 2016, both owners—Freeport-McMoRan and Lundin
18
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Mining—announced the, separate, sales of their respective stakes in the Tenke
Fungurume mine to Chinese investors for a combined price of USD 3.8 billion (Els,
2017).
The stance of the DRC’s state mining company, Gécamines, is important with regard
to these transitions, with the company initially opposing both the Kamoa and Tenke
Fungurume sales in 2012 and 2016, respectively, but ending its opposition to both after
reaching deals with the new Chinese owners. The Anvil Mining purchase went ahead
after Minmetals agreed to a payment of USD 55 million to Gécamines, and in January
2017, Gécamines—a 20 per cent stakeholder—ended its opposition to the Tenke
Fungurume sale after agreeing substantial compensation with Lundin (Els, 2017). The
role of Gécamines is further illustrated by various agreements reached with Chinese
mining firms. In July 2015, Gécamines sold a copper- and cobalt-mining permit from
its Compagnie Minière du Sud Katanga unit (CMSK) for USD 52 million to Huayou’s
Congo Dongfang International Mining Sàrl. The company, based in Lubumbashi, also
signed a ‘strategic cooperation accord’ with CNMC in June 2015. The purchase of
Gécamines’ Luiswishi and Lukuni assets aimed to give Huayou 354,619 metric tons of
copper and 62,903 tons of cobalt. The accord with CNMC would explore ‘five large
projects’ around Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi in Congo’s Katanga province.
Gécamines and CNMC subsequently agreed with CBMC to build two factories at these
existing mines with the aim of increasing the existing annual output of 15,000 tons of
refined copper by an additional 100,000 tons. The first factory, in the town of
Kambove, would process 35,000 tons per year of copper cathode while the second, at
the Deziwa mine, would process around 80,000 tons initially in return for a 51 per cent
stakeholding. CNMC would then be reimbursed through an off-take agreement over a
fixed period that had not yet been agreed, before full ownership was transferred back to
Gécamines.
19
The DRC government has played an active role in facilitating infrastructure
development in areas strategically important to the mining sector and to Gécamines’
projects. For example, in June 2016 the DRC Government awarded a USD 660 million
contract to a consortium of Chinese investors to build a 240-megawatt hydroelectric
project at Busanga, near the location of the Sicomines copper project, a joint venture
between Gécamines, China Sinohydro and the China Railway Group Ltd.
20
However, it is the DRC’s quality of overall governance that is the critical factor in
understanding the China–DRC relationship. The challenges of governance remain
immense and fragility substantial, making host Government bargaining and regulatory
enforcement problematic despite periodic attempts to exert greater control (Jamasmie,
2016). There are three principal weaknesses. The first of these is governmental
governance. This remains vulnerable to political whim and the political culture is
authoritarian and intimidatory towards investigative journalists (BBC, 2016).
Controversy surrounding adherence and opposition to the rule of law and
constitutionalism is experienced worldwide, for example in Myanmar (Cheeseman,
2016). With respect to the DRC, Reporters Without Borders’ World Press Freedom
Index 2018 ranks the DRC 154th out of 180 countries and argues that ‘reporters have
been systematically targeted by the security services, which act with complete impunity.
Radio stations that interview government opponents are often shut down or ransacked.
The authorities often disconnect the Internet or block access to social networks,
depriving the public of access to freely reported news and information’ (RSF, 2018, 1).
The current president, Joseph Kabila, was elected in 2006 in the country’s first free
elections for 40 years, and controversially re-elected in 2011. Refusing to leave office at
the end of his official term in 2016 citing conflict in eastern DRC, the date for the
presidential election was announced in November 2017 following the visit of the US’s
UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, and set for December 2018 (VoA News, 2017a). Kabila
received military training in China. Amidst highly contested government party claims
that the country could not afford—either economically or more pertinently politically—a
presidential election in 2016, as required under the Constitution, an agreement was
reached with some opposition parties to postpone the presidential election due in 2016
in return for opposition leaders being brought into government. This so-called national
dialogue was boycotted by the main opposition party, which argued the ‘dialogue’ and
21
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agreement were simply a way of President Kabila staying in office, contrary to the
country’s Constitution. Étienne Tshisekedi of the Union for Democracy and Social
Progress (UDPS) was appointed by the president to lead a transitional council. This
agreement led to violent street protests across the DRC and an estimated 40‒50 deaths
(Burke, 2016).
However, the death of Tshisekedi in February 2017, aged 84, placed a major question
mark over the agreement (Burke, 2017). During 2017‒18 the political situation
remained fragile. In January 2017, the 31 December agreement brokered by the
Catholic Bishops was said by the Congolese Bishops’ Conference to be in jeopardy and
the Conference withdrew from the mediation talks, spurring the opposition coalition
UDPS to call for popular protests. By mid-2017 the agreement had collapsed. This left
the country’s political system in a state of great uncertainty and hiatus, reinforced by
UN and European Union sanctions on political and military leaders as conflict in
Eastern DRC descended into intensifying violence and atrocities, prompting the Trump
Administration’s November call for free and fair elections by 2018 and message that the
DRC government would not receive international help with the vote if there were
further delays. The US’s stance, however, was criticised by opposition leader Olivier
Kamitatu: ‘Calling for Kabila to stay in power beyond Dec. 31, 2017, is the equivalent,
pure and simple, of making oneself complicit with the evil genius!’ (VoA News, 2017b).
22
The second weakness is the fractured character of the country, with enduring
poverty, growing inequality, and social deprivation. This raises central questions about
the redistributive capacity of the mining revenues regime. Revenue-raising is not
disengaged from the disbursement of revenues for sustainable development. Whilst the
country’s GDP has risen, the DRC’s GDP per capita is, at USD 442, one of the lowest in
the world. Despite this, there have been signs of improvement. By 2012-13, the poverty
rate (based on USD 1 per day) had fallen from 71 per cent (in 2005) to 64 per cent
(World Bank, 2016a; IMF, 2015), life expectancy had increased to 51.7 years (from 47.8
years in 2005), child mortality had decreased by 30 per cent (between 2007 and 2012)
and educational opportunities had expanded substantially (IMF, 2015). The country
moved from the low human development classification to the medium category in the
2015 Human Development Index, but was still ranked in 176th place out of 188
countries and territories (UNDP, 2015). Extreme poverty remains a major challenge. If
the benchmark of USD 1.25 a day is used, the poverty rate also decreased, but only by 5
percentage points. Despite a significant reduction in rural poverty by 14 per cent
compared to 2.3 per cent for urban areas, poverty has been more pronounced in rural
areas (65.2 per cent) than in urban centres (60.4 per cent), and has affected more men
(56 per cent) than women (49 per cent). The DRC accounted for 5 per cent of the
number of extremely poor people in the world in 2011 and ranked second for the
number of extremely poor people in sub-Saharan Africa in 2012 (IMF, 2015: 4).
Reinforcing this has been an increase in inequality. From 2005 to 2012, the Gini index
increased to 0.451, indicating a rise in inequality in the DRC (IMF, 2015, 7).
23
The third weakness is the capacity and performance of the mining sector’s own
governance regime. In 2010, a new five-year World Bank project “DRC-Growth with
Governance in the Mineral Sector” identified a series of critical deficiencies in the
governance of the country’s minerals sector. It set out three objectives: ‘To strengthen
the capacity of key institutions to manage the minerals sector, improve the conditions
for increased investments in and revenues from mining, and help increase the socio-
economic benefits from artisanal and industrial mining in project areas’. In 2010, the
Bank’s litany of five weaknesses in the effective governance of the DRC’s mining sector
included the poor performance of key institutions in the minerals sector with regard to
the enforcement of the legal and regulatory framework; a lack of available data to
support transparency and accountability mechanisms, dependent on NGO reports or
poor quality media reporting with little informed debate; the need for more private
investment in the minerals sector; and limited data regarding the working and living
conditions of artisanal and industrial mining communities.
24
By 2017, the project’s “Implementation Status and Results Report” was able to detail
progress on instituting a systematic topographical baseline and the introduction of an
artisanal and small-scale mining strategy—the Government Service to Support
25
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4. Analysis
Chinese Involvement in International Regimes
Artisanal Miners (SAESSCAM)—and creation of a system for the registration of
artisanal miners, and the provision of traceability and certification systems in Eastern
DRC and Katanga. However, the 2017 Report also identified weaknesses that needed to
be addressed, leading to the project’s completion date being extended by three years to
December 2018. The Report stated that the ‘Ministry’s communications with
stakeholders in government, the private sector and civil society are unplanned and ad
hoc which hampers the development of a coherent vision for the future of the sector’;
that ‘[s]ocial and environmental impacts of mining activities [are] not well understood
and managed’; there are ‘few outreach programmes available to improve women’s
standing in the mining sector’; the National Geological Survey ‘exists but not under the
Ministry of Mines’; provincial CAMI offices are not covered by the online cadastre
system; human resources in the Ministry of Mines and its specialised agencies are
problematic, with ‘40% of Ministry of Mines staff not on the payroll’. The group of mine
engineers and geologists is aging; SAESSCAM is ‘not clear, coherent, or
implementable’, despite an Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining (ASM) registration
system being put in place, there is limited registration carried out by artisanal miners;
and the traceability and certification systems in Eastern DRC and Katanga only have
limited reach, covering two provinces (Katanga and South Kivu). Much of this ASM
experience synchronises with evidence from the wider African experience (Mutemeri et
al., 2016). A 2014 study examined Chinese participation in Ghana’s ASM. Rural Ghana
has seen an influx of many thousands of Chinese nationals seeking to illicitly extract
gold. The study shows a lacklustre host government response and that the formation of
a national task force to tackle the problem simply fails to address the deeper and larger
causal problem of governance, ‘namely the sector’s perpetual informality, brought
about by an excessively-bureaucratic legalisation process and failure, on the part of the
government and donors, to deliver adequate and appropriate support to desperate
operators’ (Hilson et al., 2014, 292). This finding is supported by research published in
2015 evaluating Asian investment in artisanal and small-scale mines in rural
Cameroon. This highlighted ineffectual sectoral governance by the host government in
failing to enforce existing government regulations, which thereby ‘risks facilitating
enclaves of uncontrolled resource exploitation’ (Weng, 2015, 64).
A number of regimes influence the context within which the Chinese government and
Chinese firms operate in the global extractives sector. These include: (a) the “2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development” (United Nations, 2015), the Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), and the “Busan Partnership for Effective Development
Cooperation”; (b) the “United Nations Global Compact” promoting corporate social
responsibility (CSR); (c) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) and the 2015 COP 21 Paris Agreement; (d) the work and agreements of the
Group of 77; (e) the 1978 “Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and
Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries” and emerging
practices of trilateral cooperation (TC); (f); the 2005 “Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness” and 2008 “Accra Agenda for Action”; (g) “UN Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights”; (h) the United Nations Convention against Corruption
(UNCAC); and (i) the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) promoting
an international standard for openness around the management of revenues from
natural resources, currently implemented by 48 countries. This constitutes an extensive
network of regimes promoting international principles and practices seeking to
enhance the quality and effectiveness of governance. China is party to many of these
regimes. Given the criticism of Chinese firms in Africa, however, there is continuing
26
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scepticism among some observers regarding Chinese commitment to compliance,
transparency and accountability.
If we consider CSR, then the reasons for such concerns become apparent. CSR has
been embodied in Chinese corporate law and labour and contract law since 2006
(effective 2008); a decade on, CSR is not deeply embedded in Chinese business culture.
However, this is changing, with 1,722 Chinese companies filing CSR reports in 2012
compared to only 1 in 2006 (Larson, 2013). China has become party to the
International Standardisation Organisation’s ISO 26000. Initiated by ISO in 2010, this
sets out guidance on how businesses and organisations can operate in a socially
responsible way—that is to say, operate in an ethical and transparent manner
contributing to the health and welfare of a society. Interestingly, ISO had a Chinese
President, Dr Zhang Xiao, for the three-year term 2015‒17. In 2008, China’s State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
(SASAC) issued an important policy directive, the “Guidelines to the State-owned
Enterprises Directly Managed under the Central Government on Fulfilling Corporate
Social Responsibilities”. SASAC further mandated that all State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) under its supervision publish their first CSR report by the end of 2012 if they
had not already done so (Liu, 2015). In response to their negative image and to the
antipathy of local communities, evident in sub-Saharan Africa states, some leading
Chinese SOEs—such as Sinosteel, Synoptic, China Minmetals and CNPC—have begun
to disclose publicly their social investment and impact in Africa through their CSR
reports. These reports include specific attempts to address and exhibit sustainability
activities in Africa.
27
A 2012 World Economic Forum/Boston Consulting Group study noted that there
were at least 60 major Chinese companies utilising the “Global Reporting Initiative
Guidelines”. However, the study recommended that the Chinese government take
additional measures to strengthen Chinese understanding and practices of CSR,
promoting ‘a better understanding of corporate citizenship among the general public in
China’ and ‘research and training on corporate citizenship’; ‘continuously requiring
better information disclosure by Chinese companies’ and ‘multi-stakeholder dialogue
that encourages companies to learn from other leading companies, both domestically
and internationally’. Chinese firms were encouraged to ‘define a clear goal to align
business strategy and corporate citizenship’, ‘invest sufficient resources and develop a
dedicated internal team, with senior executive or board sponsorship, to integrate
corporate citizenship requirements into daily business operations’, ‘communicate more
effectively with the public by reporting more comprehensive information on corporate
citizenship’, ‘engage more effectively with various stakeholders through active
participation in regional and global multi-stakeholder dialogue platforms’, and ‘build in
organisational flexibility allowing companies to create innovative solutions to changing
environments’ (WEF, 2012, 22‒24). One response to such calls is that of China’s
Company Law promulgated in September 2013 and entering into force in March 2014.
This law is noteworthy insofar as it explicitly refers to the duty of Chinese companies to
uphold their corporate social responsibilities.
28
There is evidence of subsequent Chinese responsiveness to such recommendations on
CSR in the extractives sector. In 2014 the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals,
Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters (CCCMC) developed ‘Guidelines for
Social Responsibility in Chinese Outbound Mining Investment’. The Guidelines
regulate Chinese mining investments and operations and are intended to guide Chinese
companies in improving CSR and sustainability strategies, as well as management
systems. The Guidelines are essentially based on ISO 26000 with some exceptions to
better reflect the specifics of the mining industry (Business and Human Rights
Resource Centre, 2014). The CCCMC then followed up by producing “The Chinese Due
Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains”. According to the
CCCMC, these use the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the
OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas as their basis, and are intended to promote
integration and coordination with other related standards, regulations and initiatives
(CCCMC, 2016). The Chinese government has also sought to address issues of
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environmental CSR. In February 2013, China’s ministries of Commerce and of
Environmental Protection published “Guidelines for Environmental Protection in
Foreign Investment and Cooperation” (MOFCOM, 2013). The China Exim Bank has
issued “Guidelines for Environmental and Social Impact Assessments” and the China
Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) has produced “Green Credit Guidelines”
governing China’s financiers (CCCMC, 2016).
Turning to the EITI, the Initiative is aimed at improving corporate and governmental
transparency. China is sometimes criticised for its failure to become a member, but it
should be noted that a number of developed countries have taken their time in deciding
on membership: for example, the UK only became a member of the EITI in 2013.
Nonetheless, even though China does not implement the EITI, it has expressed its
support in several international forums, for example in the 2008 UN General Assembly
Resolution that stresses that transparency should be promoted by all Member States,
and has also supported the 2009 G20 Pittsburgh declaration that encourages
participation in the EITI. The main point is that, despite not becoming an
implementation member of the EITI, Chinese companies operating in EITI-
implementing countries are, like all extractives sector companies operating in EITI-
implementing countries, required to disclose information to comply with the EITI
Standard. This includes information about how much they pay to the governments that
implement the Initiative. This may, in some cases, includes oil and mining production
contracts, social payments and beneficial ownership. According to an EITI review of
Chinese company activity in EITI countries, ‘To date, there does not appear to be any
cases in which a company based in China has refused to collaborate with a host country
implementing the EITI. On the contrary, […] an increasing number of Chinese
companies are disclosing information in EITI countries where they are required to
report’. The review also provides findings: (a) Chinese companies disclose information
on payments to governments to the same extent as companies from other countries; (b)
at least 90 Chinese companies are involved in EITI reporting; (c) information disclosed
by Chinese companies in EITI reports goes beyond financial disclosure; (d) Chinese
companies now report in at least 23 of the 38 EITI-implementing countries with
published reports; (e) Chinese companies are actively involved in six EITI multi-
stakeholder groups (EITI, 2015).
30
A further factor is the character and effectiveness of host governance in Africa as it
relates to China and particularly to the extractive industries. Mohan and Lampert have
highlighted the need to recognise African agency, concluding that, although uneven and
politically contingent, ‘at various levels African actors have negotiated, shaped and even
driven Chinese engagements in important ways’ (2013, 92).
31
Considering Africa, this role is recognised by Africa’s political leaders and is
embodied in the policies, strategies, charters and conventions of the African Union
(AU) and sub-regional economic organisations (African Union Commission, undated).
As a basis for this commitment, there is already a significant range of declarations and
programmes in place. These include the seven aspirations of the AU ‘Agenda 2063’; the
AU Commission Strategic Plan 2014-2017; the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD); the June 2014 African Charter on the Values and Principles of
Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development; the 2007 African Charter
on Democracy, Elections and Governance; and the 2003 African Union Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption.
32
Against this backdrop, a significant African example of the challenges involved in
seeking to advance the cause of strengthening governance in the extractives sector is
the 2011 African Mining Vision (AMV). This was adopted by heads of state at the
February 2009 AU summit following the October 2008 meeting of African Ministers
responsible for Mineral Resources Development. The Vision was formulated as an
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African response to the disparity of large mineral wealth alongside extreme poverty.
Adopting a multi-tiered, ‘holistic’ framework, it advocates ‘integrating mining much
better into development policies at local, national and regional levels’ and thereby
‘opening out mining’s enclave status so that Africa can move from its historic status as
an exporter of cheap raw materials to manufacturer and supplier of knowledge-based
services’ (African Union, 2009). The African Union’s mining ministers adopted an
implementation ‘Action Plan’ in December 2011, setting out the key drivers for action
(IGF, 2012). The African Mineral Development Centre (AMDC) has been established as
the strategic focal point for the realisation of the Vision. A welter of meetings, networks
and initiatives ensued under the auspices of the AMV during the course of the following
years, with government, the mining industry and labour and civil society organisations
such as the Pan-African Network’s African Initiative on Mining, Environment and
Society (AIMES) and Southern African Resource Watch (SARW) all involved
(Kabemba, 2014).
However, AMV implementation has been criticised on a number of counts. The five-
year review of the AMV, undertaken on behalf of SARW, identified a series of failings of
the AMV from a civil societal perspective. The central theme is that, whilst there had
been a great deal of subsequent activity to try and implement this ‘pathway’,
governmental resolve in mining states has weakened and practical progress has been
limited. The report identifies critical factors weakening the AMV. The review points out
that, despite mining states including aspects of the agenda of the advocacy community
of CSOs and unions in their policies, core elements are not being realised—‘human
rights violations of mining workers and communities by companies and the state;
governments’ accountability in respect of mineral revenues, “taming” of the power and
influence exerted by mining TNCs over public policy, and a need for improvements in
the overall governance of the mining sector’. The report identifies problems of political
governance lying behind these various unrealised elements, arguing that government
enthusiasm for limited reforms has ‘tapered off’ in the face of mining company
opposition to changes in mining sector fiscal regimes. The report also argues that there
has been ‘an inadequate approach by governments seeking to revise mining contracts’
by ‘treating the political-economic contest with the TNCs as narrow bureaucratic-legal
exchanges to be kept secret from society and its pressures’.
34
Further problems listed in the report's analysis include: falling mineral prices,
increased government anxieties over mineral revenues and weakened governmental
resolve; the relative weakness and influence of CSOs and advocacy organisations in the
mining policy sector; the adverse impact of programmes of international organisations
such as the European Union’s Economic Partnership Agreements and also agreements
for public–private partnerships that could limit the space to achieve the AMV agenda
(Kabemba, 2014). In addition, The Resource Governance Index (RGI), published by the
Natural Resource Governance Institute, measures the quality of governance in the oil,
gas and mining industries in 81 countries that together produce 82 per cent of the
world’s oil, 78 per cent of its gas and a significant proportion of minerals, including 72
per cent of all copper. The 2013 RGI concluded that there was a serious gap in the
quality of governance of natural resources worldwide and in Africa, whilst the 2017 RGI
has sought to move beyond the composite rankings to underline the variability of sub-
composite aspects of governance (NRGI, 2013; 2017).
35
Chinese ‘state capitalism’ is highly variegated (Gu et al., 2016). China’s approaches to
sustainable development and to governance are the product of its domestic economic
history, defined national interests and strategic priorities and its increasing exposure to
development dialogue and practices outside China. The Chinese government and
Chinese firms are on a steep learning curve. African governments and firms are on an
equally sharp learning trajectory as they accumulate experience of dealing with China.
Africa has extensive regulatory and normative regimes that frame Chinese state and
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corporate relations with the region. Africa has travelled a hard road, but the
commitment by African states and the AU to improving the quality and effectiveness of
political, economic and sociocultural governance has strengthened significantly over
the past decade with a substantial body of ‘nested’ regulatory and normative regimes
being established at the regional, sub-regional, national and sub-national ‘local’ levels.
However, as the DRC case illustrates, the effectiveness of these regimes is highly
variable, depending on political and economic implementation capacity within the
particular host state and the institutional integrity of the governance architecture. The
critical factor influencing such effectiveness is, however, the countervailing power that
can be marshalled by a host government and this, crucially, is contingent upon the
quality of governance.
37
To help strengthen host country governance, the Chinese government needs to move
beyond voluntary guidelines on CSR and towards a firmer regulatory monitoring and
reporting framework. In addition, China’s standing would be enhanced in the
extractives sector should it decide to become an implementing member of the EITI.
More Chinese firms too need to take stock of their corporate profile and CSR
commitments. Already we are seeing the seeds of change, with significant EITI
reporting practices from a growing number of Chinese firms in EITI-implementing
countries—with a notable number going beyond minimal requirements—and also an
emerging body of enterprises engaged in CSR. The guidelines on corporate
responsibility produced by the CCCMC are a further positive sign.
38
In addition, African states need to build upon the body of declaratory policy and
programmes promoting better governance to drive these home within countries. It is
the culture and quality of political, financial, commercial and social governance and
responsiveness to principles of ‘legitimacy, efficiency, democracy and accountability’
(Kjær, 2004) that remains the most substantial challenge for African states seeking to
maximise the benefits and minimise the risks in their relationships with China.
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Notes
1 The Gini coefficient is a measure of wealth distribution on a scale of 0 (most equal) to 1 (most
unequal).
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